FOREIGN NEWS usually gets short shrift in India. Yet for the past month the country’s television channels have been dominated by wall-to-wall coverage of events in Israel and Gaza, mostly from Israel’s perspective. News anchors in bulletproof vests stand in the desert delivering breathless reports on the aftermath of Hamas’s atrocities in Israel on October 7th. Talk-show hosts restage the Palestinian terrorist group’s attack from Gaza with toy soldiers and miniature bulldozers. Weeks into the war, coverage remains intense.

外國新聞通常在印度不受關注。然而,過去一個月,該國的電視臺卻用以色列的視角和立場,來報道以色列和加沙的事件。新聞主播穿著防彈衣站在沙漠中,呼吸急促地報道哈馬斯于10月7日和以色列的戰爭。脫口秀主持人用玩具士兵和推土機模型重新演繹了巴勒斯坦恐怖組織在加沙的襲擊。戰爭進行了數周,報道仍然非常多。

The media’s fascination with Israel’s plight and retribution coincides with a marked shift in the Indian government’s stance on the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. It has moved from backing the Palestinians to more or less unqualified support for Israel. The pivot is based on a realist reappraisal of Indian interests in the Middle East. It has also met with strong public backing from Narendra Modi’s domestic supporters, which is gratifying for Mr Modi’s government ahead of state elections this month and a general election next year.

在以色列和巴勒斯坦之間的沖突后,媒體更多報道了以色列的處境,印度政府立場的轉變速度之快。已經從支持巴勒斯坦轉變為對以色列支持了。這種轉變基于印度在中東利益的重新評估。這也得到了納倫德拉·莫迪政府本月州選舉和明年大選前的公眾地支持,對莫迪的政府來說是有利的。

In the past, like many countries in the global south, India tempered any expression of support for Israel with expressions of concern for the Palestinians’ plight. No more. Mr Modi took to X (formerly Twitter) within hours of Hamas’s assault to express his horror at the “terrorist attacks” and declare that “we stand in solidarity with Israel”. It took five days for India’s Ministry of External Affairs to reiterate, in response to questions from reporters, that India continued to support a two-state solution to the conflict. On October 27th, in a departure from its usual voting record, India abstained as the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for a humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza; it obxted that the text did not condemn Hamas’s assault.

過去,像許多全球南方國家一樣,印度在表達對以色列支持的同時,也會表達對巴勒斯坦人困境的關切?,F在不會如此了。莫迪在哈馬斯襲擊數小時內就上了X(前身為Twitter),表達了他對“恐怖襲擊”的震驚,并宣布“我們與以色列站在一起”。在印度外交部回應記者的問題時,花了五天時間重申印度仍然支持解決沖突的兩國方案。10月27日,與其通常的投票記錄不同,印度棄權,因為聯合國大會通過了呼吁在加沙實施人道主義?;鸬臎Q議;印度反對決議案的文章里面,沒有譴責哈馬斯襲擊事件。

The shift reflects India’s growing defence and commercial ties to Israel. Co-operation between the two countries has been deepening ever since Israel provided India with military help during the Kargil war against Pakistan in 1999. That was long before America took a serious interest in military co-operation with India. Over the past decade India has bought missiles, drones and border-security equipment (and probably surveillance software, though it has not admitted this) from Israel, making it the Israeli defence industry’s biggest foreign customer.

這種轉變反映了印度與以色列的國防和商業關系的日益加深。兩國之間的合作自1999年,以色列在印巴戰爭中向印度提供軍事幫助開始。那是在美國與印度的軍事合作之前。在過去的十年中,印度從以色列購買了導彈、無人機和邊境安全設備(也可能是監視軟件,盡管印度沒有承認),使印度成為以色列國防工業最大的外國客戶。
原創翻譯:龍騰網 http://www.codygalaherlaw.com 轉載請注明出處


A bromance between Mr Modi and Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, has deepened the relationship. So has the two countries’ shared preoccupation with fighting terrorism, especially the Islamist variant. Explaining the abstention in the UN vote, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, India’s foreign minister, said in a speech on October 29th that India took a strong position on terrorism “because we are big victims of terrorism”.

莫迪和以色列總理本雅明·內塔尼亞胡之間的兄弟情誼加深了兩國關系。兩國對打擊恐怖主義,尤其是面臨伊斯蘭恐怖主義的這一共同點也加深了這種關系。印度外交部長蘇布拉曼揚·賈伊沙卡爾在10月29日的講話中,解釋了印度在聯合國投票中的棄權原因,稱印度在恐怖主義問題上采取了強硬立場,“因為我們是恐怖主義的受害者”。
原創翻譯:龍騰網 http://www.codygalaherlaw.com 轉載請注明出處


India has also been increasing its ties with Gulf Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. And it can ill afford to alienate them; it depends on them for much of its oil and goodwill towards an estimated 9m expatriate Indian workers. Yet the fact that both countries have recently moved closer to Israel has allowed Mr Modi to effect his shift with alacrity. Even in the current crisis, the Saudis and Emiratis appear reluctant to allow the events in Gaza to cause a rupture in their long-term rapprochement with Israel.

印度也在加強與海灣阿拉伯國家的聯系,特別是沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯聯合酋長國。而印度無法承受疏遠它們的后果;印度依賴它們提供大部分石油,以及900萬印度外籍工人的工作崗位。然而,這兩個國家最近都與以色列走得更近,這讓莫迪得以迅速實現他的外交轉變。即使在當前的危機中,沙特和阿聯酋似乎也不愿讓加沙事件破壞它們與以色列的長期友好關系。

Domestically, the Modi government’s pivot is essentially all upside. The Congress-led opposition has condemned it; leaders of India’s 200m Muslims have heavily criticised Israel’s military response. Yet the Indian middle-class that mostly backs Mr Modi is especially concerned about Islamist terrorism. Its members look on Hamas’s attack and recall the tragedy Mumbai suffered in 2008, when Pakistani Islamists killed 175 people and wounded more than 300 during a four-day rampage. It included an attack on a Jewish community centre in the city, where the terrorists murdered the rabbi and his pregnant wife.

在國內,莫迪政府的轉變基本上只有好處。國大黨的反對派譴責了這一舉動;印度2億穆斯林領袖強烈批評了以色列的軍事行動。然而,大多數支持莫迪的印度中產階級特別擔心伊斯蘭恐怖主義。他們看到哈馬斯的襲擊,回想起2008年孟買遭受的悲劇,當時巴基斯坦伊斯蘭分子在為期四天的瘋狂行動中殺死了175人,受傷300多人。其中包括對城市的一個猶太社區中心的襲擊,恐怖分子殺害了拉比和他懷孕的妻子。

There is a small risk the government will overplay its hand. As the civilian death toll in Gaza rises, India’s Arab partners might turn against the Israelis and their backers more aggressively. Mr Modi has latterly hedged against that possibility. He has reached out to Palestinian leaders, offering Indian condolences and humanitarian aid. Meanwhile, his Hindu-nationalist henchmen are unrestrained in using the conflict to stoke the Islamophobia that has propelled their party’s rise. Even if Mr Modi’s pivot becomes difficult abroad, it will probably help him win elections.

印度政府可能有一點做過了頭。隨著加沙的平民死亡人數上升,印度的阿拉伯伙伴可能會更積極地對以色列及其支持者采取行動。莫迪最近已對這種可能性進行了規避。他已與巴勒斯坦領導人取得了聯系,提供印度的慰問和人道主義援助。與此同時,他的印度教民族主義黨羽,在利用這場沖突煽動伊斯蘭恐懼癥。即使莫迪的轉向阻力大,依然可能會幫助他贏得選舉。